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The Financial and Fiscal Stress Interconnectedness: 
The Case of G5 Economies 
 
  
 
Abstract: In this paper, we focus on the financial and fiscal stress transmission for 
the G5 economies. Using financial and fiscal stress indexes, we assess the spillovers 
within each economy, as well as the cross-sectional effects. Two supplementary 
methodologies, measuring the degree of interconnectedness, are employed. Our 
findings indicate that the interactions between these two kinds of distress are 
intensive, especially during and after the Global Financial Crisis outbreak. The above 
reiterates the necessity for coordinated macroprudential policies, as a means to 
confine the adverse effects of excessive financial and fiscal stress. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent global financial crisis has emphatically shown that excessive 
financial risk-taking can pose a serious threat for the global financial stability. At the 
same time, it can also have substantial adverse effects to the world’s economic 
activity. There is an ongoing debate on whether business cycle is related with the 
financial cycle. A few recent studies aim to investigate this potential relation of 
business and financial cycles (Claessens et al., 2012, Tagkalakis, 2013, Andrian et al., 
2010). 
Moreover, governments are increasingly concerned with the policy challenges 
posed by the financial cycle. Especially, given the emergence of systemic risk issues 
as a major threat for financial and banking markets around the world, there is a 
trend for the adoption of the most appropriate macroprudential policies to safeguard 
these markets. As Borio (2012) put it, “Macroeconomics without the financial cycle is 
very much like Hamlet without the Prince: a play that has lost its main character”, 
meaning that macroeconomic policies would not be effective, as long as the financial 
cycle and its pro-cyclical nature are not taken into account by the authorities. 
Within the previously described framework, this paper aims to contribute to 
the examination of the potential interactions between financial conditions and their 
ensuing effects on the fiscal position of five major economies. In particulate, we 
model the financial and fiscal stress spillovers for the G5 countries. There is some 
evidence in the literature, indicating the existence of interactions of financial and 
economic cycles (Magkonis and Tsopanakis, 2014, Dovern and van Roye, 2014). We 
try to build upon this literature, in several dimensions. First, we use a set of 
aggregate indicators, namely the financial and fiscal stress indices, as proxies of the 
effects of financial cycle and real economy swings. Second, we employ innovative 
econometric approach, which is able to capture the stress volatility spillovers within 
each economy. Then, beyond the country level analysis, potential cross-national 
spillover effects are examined, so that further light can be shed in the potential 
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channels of instability transmission on a global scale. Fourth, network analysis is 
used, employing the dynamic causality index as proposed by Billio et al. (2012). The 
aim is to provide further evidence and enhance the reliability of our main empirical 
findings. Finally, our dataset cover a long period, up until the most recent events in 
the global economy. 
Our findings indicate that there is a strong interconnection between the 
financial and fiscal stress shocks for all economies in the sample. Depending on the 
case, the financial stress is prominent, compared to the fiscal distress. It is also 
identifiable the fact that all spillover effects become more intensive during and after 
the initiation of the Global Financial Crisis. Especially for the case of the 
international spillover effects, the degree of interconnectedness between the G5 
economies has reached an unprecedented level in the last few years. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the most relevant 
literature in the topic examined here. The construction methodology for the financial 
and fiscal stress indexes is developed in section 3, while section 4 introduces the 
methodology employed for the spillover analysis. The results from the baseline 
model, both for the national as well as the international spillover effects, are 
discussed in section 5. The network analysis is presented in section 6, while section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Measuring Financial-Fiscal stress Interactions and their real economy effects 
This brief overview of the literature is focused on the most recent research, 
related to the financial and business cycles interactions, their importance for the 
economic conditions and the fiscal position of the global economy. The growing 
importance of the financial cycles is recently recognised by academics and monetary 
authorities, after identifying the inexorable effects of financial market conditions on 
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the global economic stance. The Euro Area crisis is a critical economic event, 
underlying the importance of this area of research. 
Claessens et al. (2011) analyse the financial cycles for 21 advanced economies 
over the previous few decades. The authors find that the financial cycles downturns 
last between five and eight quarters, while the upturns are longer and slower. 
Moreover, the global synchronization of downturns leads to longer and deeper 
recessions. In their next paper, Claessens et al. (2012) investigate the financial and 
business cycles interactions. Their research covers a period of fifty years again, from 
1960 to 2010, with forty four countries in their dataset. In this paper, their main 
finding is a strong link between the different phases of the two types of cycles, while 
exacerbated recessions are related with house and equity prices. In terms of their 
duration and effects, they point out that financial cycles are deeper than the business 
ones, with more pronounced effects on the emerging markets rather than the 
developed economies. 
Further evidence on the financial cycle duration and the effects of house and 
equity price fluctuations are provided by Drehmann et al. (2012). According to this 
paper, financial cycles last about sixteen years, with gradually increasing life span 
since the mid 80’s. Kannan (2012) study the effects on the economy’s recovery phase 
from a recession, when a financial crisis is to be blamed for this recessionary period. 
Based on industry – level data, the author shows that recessions caused by financial 
turmoils can lead to higher output losses in developed economies, with a longer 
recovery period compared to cases where the recession is not due to adverse 
financial conditions. 
A number of studies attempted to empirically analyse the relation of financial 
cycle and financial stress with, either, the real economy or the financial markets. For 
instance, Chen et al. (2012) study the interest rates, output, asset prices and credit 
nexus for the US economy using a multivariate unobserved component model. The 
main finding here is that those variables’ cycles are closely related. Karfakis (2013) 
studies the relationship of credit and business cycles for Greece, showing that credit 
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is a useful indicator for monitoring future changes in the Greek business cycle. Also, 
credit limited availability was one of the factors that worsened the Greek economy’s 
recession, during the recent crisis. Evidence that fiscal position of OECD economies 
significantly deteriorate due to financial crises is provided by Tagkalakis (2013). This 
effect is more persistent for economies with well functioning financial markets, while 
the debt burden of those economies increases together with the outbreak of financial 
crashes.  
An explicit use of financial stress indexes, as metrics of the financial market 
conditions, is materialized by Dovern and van Roye (2014). In this paper, the authors 
analyze the international transmission of financial stress, while they also model its 
effect on the real economic activity. After indicating a significant comovement of 
financial stress for the 20 economies in the sample, they use a GVAR modelling 
approach to show that US financial stress shocks have a significant effect on the 
global economy, with its maximum impact being reached after almost 6 months in 
most cases. More recently, Hippler and Kabir Hassan (2015) examine the importance 
of macroeconomic and financial stress on US financial firms. Using a panel 
regression model for modelling firms’ profitability and stock returns, the authors 
show that financial institutions are prone to excessive financial and macroeconomic 
stress, with non-depository institutions (such as investment firms and real estate 
companies) being the major sources of the financial instability. 
The previously discussed papers establish the theoretical and empirical link 
of financial conditions with business cycles, while there is also clear evidence that 
financial stress have an effect on the financial markets. It is also important to 
underline the importance of financial conditions on the governments’ fiscal stance. 
The recent Euro Area crisis indicated that economic policy making should also 
monitor the evolving situation with the public sector finances, together with their 
interrelation with financial spillovers. Such early warning indicators are the fiscal 
stress indexes that we employ in this paper. The following papers are relevant to the 
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fiscal prudence literature and the importance of monitoring the state of fiscal and 
business cycle conditions. 
The need to monitor a broad array of fiscal conditions indicators is 
emphasised by Hemming and Petrie (2000). Fiscal sustainability is emphasized, 
based on theoretical and practical policy considerations providing a number of 
useful metrics. For example, the overall fiscal balance to GDP ratio and net financial 
debt to GDP, together with the maturity and currency composition of national debt, 
are some of the indicators put forward by the authors. Additionally, revenue 
indicators, along with indices related to primary balance and the future 
demographic changes of an economy, are proposed as well. The authors, finally, 
suggest a set of criteria, according to which fiscal vulnerability indicators should be 
chosen for monitoring. These are the initial fiscal position of the economy, the short-
term fiscal risk, the long-term sustainability and the relevant structural weaknesses. 
One of the first efforts to construct an aggregate fiscal stress index is done by 
Baldacci et al. (2011a). Here, the authors provide a set of variables as early warning 
indicators of fiscal strain and rollover risk that can be included in a relevant 
aggregate index. In this way, they develop a fiscal monitoring framework, through 
the construction of two aggregate indices (namely, a fiscal vulnerability and a fiscal 
stress index)1. Using annual data for the period 1970-2010, Baldacci et al. (2011b) 
extend the previously mentioned work, by producing fiscal stress indexes for 
advanced and emerging economies. Their empirical analysis reveals that the best 
tools for predicting fiscal imbalances for advanced economies are the gross financing 
needs and the fiscal solvency risks variables. As far as the emerging economies are 
concerned, public debt structure and the spillover risks from the international 
financial markets play a crucial role. Focusing on the current crisis, the authors 
                                                          
1 The theoretical framework is found at the work of Cottarelli (2011), where the three major reasons of 
government’s rollover risks are analysed.   
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provide evidence of heightening fiscal stress for both groups of countries, while the 
leaders of this increase are Europe and North America2. 
Two recent papers, employing fiscal stress indices for studying the Euro Area 
experience with fiscal vulnerabilities, are those by Berti et al. (2012) and Hernandez 
de Cos et al. (2014). Here, the signalling approach is used in order to construct fiscal 
stress indexes for the EU and nine more advanced economies (only for 11 EMU 
economies in the second paper). The results are in favour of using aggregate stress 
indexes as early warning tools, while the usage of country specific characteristics are 
also crucial in setting the crises alarming thresholds for the model. Until now, the 
only paper employing both financial and fiscal stress indices to study the financial 
cycle and fiscal position interactions for the G7 economies is the one by Magkonis 
and Tsopanakis (2014). Using a SVAR model and two different identification 
methods, the authors show that fiscal and financial stress shocks have a negative 
effect on key macroeconomic variables. On top of that, a weak feedback effect is 
identified, between financial and fiscal sector shocks. 
 
3. The Financial and Fiscal Stress Indices 
Our dataset consists of a set of Financial (FSI) and Fiscal (FiscSI) stress indices. These 
are aggregate indicators, summarizing information from a wider set of stand-alone 
indicators, representing different types of financial risks and fiscal conditions. Their 
value added, compared to stand alone indicators, is the ability to capture different 
sources of instability that can lead to episodes of excessive financial bottlenecks and 
fiscal strain, into one single variable. In this way, an accurate and timely 
representation of the economic and financial conditions is offered, while the effects 
of many different financial markets (in the case of the FSIs) and fiscal vulnerability 
                                                          
2 Schaechter et al. (2012) provide a good example of how this kind of research can be used for policy 
making.   
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indicators (in the case of FiscSIs) are offered. Based on these indexes, we can 
investigate the relationship between financial and fiscal stress. 
In order to construct these indices, we employ the approach used by 
Magkonis and Tsopanakis (2014). The financial stress indexes are constructed 
followed the equal-variance approach. According to this, the FSI is a composite 
indicator, in which each variable contributes to the aggregate index, based on its 
standardized value. That is, we deduct the mean and divide by its standard 
deviation. In this way, measurement problems are avoided, while the contribution of 
each single indicator is measured to deviations from its mean value. Each 
standardized component has assigned weight of equal importance to the final stress 
index. Kliesen et al. (2012) summarize a number of aggregation approaches for the 
building-up of such composite indicators. Nevertheless, the equal–variance 
approach is as efficient as any other methodology, in terms of the accurate depiction 
of financial stress episodes, as well as the most cost effective, in terms of easiness and 
effectiveness of the indexes produced. 
The components of the FSI are discussed below. First, we include the banking 
sector beta. It is calculated as the ratio of the moving covariance of year-over-year 
percentage change of each country’s banking sector equity index, with the general 
equity index, over the moving variance of the general stock index. Also, the TED 
spread is the difference between the uncovered (3-month LIBOR) and covered 
(respective Treasury bill rate) investments for the interbank markets. Moreover, the 
inverted term spread (Treasury bill rate difference from the long-term government 
bond yield) is used. The two aforementioned indicators are the most well known 
ones capturing liquidity risk exposure. For the securities markets, we employ three 
measures: the corporate bond spread, defined as the yield difference of the long-
term corporate bonds from the governmental ones, along with stock returns and the 
stock returns volatility (calculated as a GARCH(1,1) model of the general equity 
index. As a proxy of the exchange rate risk, the real effective exchange rate volatility 
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is incorporated to our index3. The mathematical representation of the financial stress 
index is the following: 
 
FSI  TED spread  Inverted term spread  
           Corporate Bond spread Stock market returns  
           Stock market volatility xchange rate market volatilityE
   
 

   (1) 
For the case of FiscSI, the aggregation methodology resembles the one used for the 
FSI indexes while the metrics involved capture three important characteristics of the 
economic activity (Baldacci et al., 2011a); 1) the fiscal burden of the economy, 2) the 
long term trends on their fiscal position (based on the fertility rate and the 
governmental funding needs for social security issues) and 3) each country’s 
financing needs. Our indices consist of five variables. First, it is the difference of the 
government debt payments rate (r) from the growth rate of the economy (g), 
representing the degree of economy’s solvency and the closeness to a fiscal crisis 
outbreak. An economy needs to service its debt obligations and its ability to do it 
depends on the level of its growth rate. Then, the general government structural 
balance, defined as the cyclically adjusted balance, is part of the aggregate fiscal 
conditions measure. Finally, the general government net debt is calculated as the 
difference between the gross debt of the country from any relevant financial assets 
that correspond to debt instruments. All three variables are expressed as percentages 
of the country’s GDP. 
Long term fiscal trends are approximated by the total fertility rate and the old 
age dependency ratio. The average number of children per woman is the proxy for 
total fertility rate, while the old dependency ratio reflects the projections for the 
share of population that will be over 65 in the next 30 years, as a percentage of the 
total adult population. These indices importance lies on the economies tax base 
projections that they offer. On top of that, they also represent the number of people 
contributing to the fiscal sustainability of a country, through their contribution to the 
                                                          
3 Here, the BIS database of effective exchange rates has been used. The estimation is the same with the 
one followed for the stock return volatility.  
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healthcare and pension systems. Overall, the FiscSI are indexes providing an overall 
picture of the short and long term conditions that are expected to prevail on the 
fiscal performance of each economy’s government. 
The aggregation method is similar to the one followed for the financial stress 
index. The only difference is that the mean and the standard deviation used are the 
10-year peer group average. This formula can shortly be written as follows: 
 
FiscSI ( )  structural balance  net debt + fertility rate  depedency ratior g      (2) 
 
Our sample is the G5 economies; Canada, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and 
United States. The dataset consists of quarterly observations, covering a period from 
the beginning of 1980’s until the first quarter of 2014. 
The following two graphs exhibit the financial and fiscal stress indexes for the 
G5 economies. A strong co-movement of the indices throughout the period 
examined can be identified. Some variations might be identified, but overall, most of 
these economies represent similar financial conditions for the last four decades. The 
80’s, for instance, was a period of relatively tranquil conditions in the financial 
markets, and lasted until after the mid 90’s. In the particular time, the Asian financial 
crisis led to increasing financial bottlenecks for all the economies of the sample. The 
most notable even of the following time period is, without any question, the Global 
Financial crisis, initiated on 2007. It is interesting to note the value added of the FSI 
indexes, as early warning indicators of the gradually deteriorating financial 
conditions. For all G5 economies, indexes have started to climb as early as 2004. 
Figure 1 here 
Financial stress reach its peak during the third quarter of 2008, coinciding 
with the Lehman Brothers collapse, with two more periods of excessive financial 
stress in early 2010 and in the second half of 2012. For some economies, like Canada 
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and UK, the index is back towards its long run value, faster than the others. Overall, 
only Germany’s case shows an upward turn in the most recent period. 
In case of the FiscSI indexes, G5 countries show a significant worsening of 
their fiscal stance during the recent financial crisis. Japan is in the worst position, 
given the fiscal trends shown here. The conditions of this economy constantly grow 
gloomier, since mid 90’s. On the other hand, Canada’s case follows the opposite 
direction, with a significant improvement in the last four years. The other three 
countries of our sample (Germany, UK, USA), demonstrate a positive value for their 
indices (even though the German index was below zero for most of the 1990’s). 
Nevertheless, they did not remain untouched in the recent years, showing increasing 
fiscal burden. Still, they manage to contain these fiscal trends within manageable 
level of fiscal risks. 
Figure 2 here 
 
4. Methodology 
We use the spillover analysis developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012, 2015). The 
analysis is based on VAR modeling and the corresponding estimation of variance 
decompositions. The main advantage of this method is that it provides information 
about the contribution of shocks to variables to the forecast error variances of all the 
variables of the model. This model is briefly written as N-variable VAR:  
 1
1
K
t t t
k
Y Y 

     (3) 
where 1 2( , ,..., )t t t NtY Y Y Y  is the vector of the N endogenous variables and t is the 
vector of disturbances that independently distributed over time. A useful alternative 
specification that is based on (3) is the moving average representation that is equal to 
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0
t j t j
j
Y e



    (4) 
where 
1 1 2 2 ...j j j p j p          . In this paper, according to Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2012), we use the generalized VAR modelling approach that based on Koop 
et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998). Under this framework, the variance 
decompositions are invariant to the variable ordering. More specifically, the ij entry 
of the H-step-ahead variance decomposition is equal to 
 
1
1 ' 2
0
1
' '
0
( )
( )
( )
H
jj i h j
h
ij H
i h h i
h
e e
z H
e e








 


  (5) 
where jj is the standard deviation of e for the j
th equation,  is the variance matrix 
of e. The drawback of the generalized VAR modelling is that the own and cross-
variable variance contributions shares do not equal to one. This is circumvented by 
using the normalization;  
 
1
( )
( )
( )
ij
ij N
ij
j
z H
H
z H




  (6) 
            
where 
1 , 1
( ) 1 and ( )
N N
ij ij
j i j
H H N 
 
    
Given the above the total spillover index is equal to 
 , 1,
, 1
( )
100
( )
N
ij
i j i j
N
ij
i j
H
SI
H


 

 


  (7) 
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The number of this index shows the average contribution of spillovers from shocks 
to all variables to the total forecast error variance. Alternatively, the spillover index 
gives the degree of the connectedness of the K-variables system. The main advantage 
of this analysis is that the directional spillover effects can be easily calculated. For 
instance, for the case of variable i and the effects from all the other variables, the 
computation should be 
 1,
, 1
( )
100
( )
N
ij
j i j
i j N
ij
i j
H
DSI
H


 


 


  (8) 
On the other hand, the directional spillover transmission from variable i to all the 
rest is defined as  
 1,
, 1
( )
100
( )
N
ji
j i j
i j N
ij
i j
z H
DSI
z H
 


 


  (9) 
Finally, in order to examine whether one variable is net receiver or transmitter of 
shock, the net spillover effects are calculated as  
 i i j i jNSI DSI DSI     (10) 
 All the above described measures are static. This means that they are 
calculated for the whole period under study. The period that we examine in this 
study contains certain sub-periods of special interest, like the financial turmoil 
starting in August 2007 in US. Therefore, static analysis may omit several aspects of 
stress transmission. For this reason, we provide the dynamic version of spillover 
analysis using rolling estimation with a 200-months window. In the next section we 
report the results from the dynamic analysis. We firstly start with the estimation of 
financial and fiscal stress spillovers for each country separately. Successively, we 
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proceed by estimating the cross-national effects. In other words, we let cross-sections 
interactions of the two kinds of stress among the examined economies. 
 
5. Results  
5.1 National Spillover Effects 
Figures 3-7 show the gross spillovers from financial and fiscal stress indexes 
for G5 economies. Starting from Canada (Figure 3), our findings suggest that 
financial spillovers prevail throughout the whole time period. Despite this fact, both 
financial and fiscal spillovers follow a similar pattern. More precisely, they reach a 
peak in early 2000’s that coincides with dot-com bubble. After a period of gradual 
decrease followed by a steep drop around early 2005, financial spillovers have been 
increased since 2008. So, the evidence is close to our expectation regarding the 
period of global financial crisis. 
On the other hand fiscal conditions are found less volatile. After a tranquil 
period, fiscal spillovers exhibited an abrupt increase until 2002. A period of declining 
trend followed until late 2009, where the peak was reached in early 2011. A steadily 
declining trend is observed until the end of the sample. Interestingly enough, while 
fiscal spillovers decline during 2011, financial stress spillovers start deescalating 
after on the second half of 2013. This is an indication of the fact that financial 
markets remain volatile quite a longer time after the government intervention. 
Figure 4 shows a different picture for Germany. Both spillover indexes follow 
a declining trend for the whole period. The magnitude of financial spillovers are 
found be slightly lower than the fiscal ones. However, after 2005 until 2014 both are 
roughly the same. This evidence indicates that Eurozone crisis has not any serious 
effect on financial and fiscal stress spillovers. Germany, being the powerhouse and 
the biggest economy of Europe, was seen by international financial investors as a 
safe haven choice. Despite the European sovereign debt crisis that culminated in 
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2011-12, German financial and fiscal stress spillovers remain significantly low 
without any increasing trend. Part of this explanation is the fact that German 
sovereign borrowing became even cheaper. Overall, the prudent macroeconomic 
policies followed as result of Maastricht treaty led German fiscal and financial 
spillovers at constantly declining levels. 
As far as the Asian representative of our sample is concerned, stress 
transmission from the fiscal side of the economy prevailing for a significant period of 
time (Figure 5). This may be viewed as a reflection of Japanese attempts to escape for 
the anaemic growth and deflationary environment. Since late 2009, however, 
financial stress spillovers have become prominent and significantly higher than fiscal 
ones until 2014. This suggests that the outbreak of financial turbulence of 2008-9 has 
also contributed to the reversal of fiscal and financial spillovers effects.  
A similar outcome is found for the UK economy in Figure 6. Fiscal 
transmission spillovers are higher for almost one decade. From 2008, however, until 
the end of the sample financial spillovers become much higher. Financial spillovers 
reached their climax between 2009 and 2011 indicating the significance of excessive 
financial stress. Finally, regarding the US spillovers (Figure 7), we find a very close 
comovement of both measures. This almost parallel movement is characterised by a 
constant increase since 2006. The credit crunch and overall financial strain are 
reflected to the increase of both spillover indexes. The fiscal stress transmission is de-
escalating during 2010, only after the deployment of quantitative easing and bailout 
policies. 
In the addition to the above results, we also report the net spillover effects, 
shown in panel B of Figures 3-7. When positive values appear in the net graphs, this 
means that financial stress shocks are transmitted to fiscal stress and vice versa.  We 
can identify three distinct cases of stress transmission. Firstly, for Canada and Japan, 
financial shocks deepen fiscal deterioration. Especially for Canada this effect holds 
for almost the whole sample, whilst for Japan is more evident for the last six years. 
Secondly, an opposite effect is found for Germany, where the net spillover index is 
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persistently negative; an indication that fiscal sector’s stress is predominant. Since 
2006 the index becomes positive but remains close to zero. Finally, there is no clear 
pattern for the UK and US cases as both types of stress seem to be lead transmitters 
interchangeably. 
Figures 3-7 here 
 
5.2 Cross-National Spillover Effects 
So far we have analysed each country separately. One lesson from the recent crisis 
was that international transmission has been severely intensified. In order to 
examine the transnational pattern of risk transmission we estimate fiscal and 
financial spillovers across all G5. This means that the equation (3) contains now 10 
variables. Figure 8 exhibits the total dynamic spillover index. According to the 
results, there is an increasing trend for most of the examined period. Initially, the 
index exhibits constantly declining values until early 2000s. After a sharp increase in 
2001, followed by a relatively tranquil period, the spillover index started to escalate. 
This can be interpreted as an early warning indicator for the forthcoming financial 
meltdown. The highest value is 75% and was reached in 2011q1. After that there is a 
sharp decline; the index reaches a value of 60% in the end of the sample. Still, the 
index level remains significantly high.  
Figure 8 here 
 
This evidence underlines a number of issues. Firstly, the degree of 
interconnectedness among G5 economies is high for all the examined period. During 
the late 1990s the degree is around 50% which shows a high interdependence even 
for a period that it is considered to be the last part of the so-called Great Moderation. 
Secondly, as in the case of Canada, Japan, UK and US, the total spillover increased 
the period after the Global Financial crisis. Finally, our evidence tends to show that 
the stress level seems to be less pronounced. However, the value still remains high. 
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This indicates that the period of financial and fiscal tranquillity has not yet fully 
achieved.    
 
6. Further Evidence 
As a way to test the validity of the previous findings, we use a different 
methodology that can be viewed as a supplementary to Diebold-Yilmaz spillover 
analysis. We employ the Dynamic causality index (DCI) proposed by Bilio et al. 
(2012). This method is based on Granger-causality networks and provides 
information about the interdependence of the examined variables. Its main feature is 
that does not depend on variance-decomposition analysis and, thus, there is no need 
for identifying assumptions. The restriction is, however, that it is focusing only on 
pairwise relations. Despite these differences between these two methods, we use 
DCI as an alternative proxy to measure the interdependence of international stress 
indicators. 
In particular, DCI is the ratio of pairwise relationships that are found to be 
statistically significant to the total number of pairs. As we examined in the last 
section, we focus on the cross-sectional effects so we examine 10 series (fiscal and 
financial stress for G5). This means that we have 90 = 10! (10 − 2)!⁄  pairs in total. 
We calculate the causality index for the same 200-months rolling window. A helpful 
way to illustrate the empirical outcomes is though network visualisation. Network 
graphs provide better insights regarding the degree of stress interconnectedness of 
the examined economies. Granger-causality relations are drawn as straight lines 
connecting two variables4.  
In order to take into account the potential effects from the Global Financial 
crisis, we proceed with a subsample analysis. That is, we plot two network graphs; 
one for the pre-crisis period and one for the post-crisis period. We consider as the 
                                                          
4 The codes that we used to calculate the DCI provide only the causal relationship, without specifying 
the direction of causality.  Hence, no arrows have been used in the network graphs.  
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cut-off point the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008. Figures 8 and 9 
present the causal relationships for 2005q1 and 2010q35.  
Figure 9 here 
Figure 10 here 
Comparing the two networks we can discern that for the latter period the 
interconnectedness has slightly increased. From 19 causal relationships in the pre-
crisis sample, the number is increased to 21 for the post-crisis one. So, the total 
interconnectedness as measured by the DCI has not significantly changed. Focusing 
on the exact causal relations, we find that the more interconnected variables seem to 
be the German fiscal and financial stress for the sample before crisis. After crisis, 
however, the connectedness of American financial stress is found to play a 
predominant role; a financial stress is connected with almost all the remaining series. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The aftermath of the global financial crisis has shown that there should be linkages 
between financial and fiscal sectors.  In this paper we examine the potential channels 
of interaction between financial and fiscal conditions for the G5 economies. In order 
to do so, we construct a set of financial and fiscal stress indexes as proxies of 
financial and fiscal distress. Our contribution is twofold. Firstly, we model the 
interactions between these two indexes within each economy. Then, we proceed 
with the cross-sectional interconnections between economies.   
 We estimate the stress indexes’ interactions using the methodology developed 
by Diebold-Yilmaz. In this way, we capture the spillover effects of financial stress to 
fiscal stress and vice versa. According to our findings, Canadian and Japanese fiscal 
conditions are more prone to financial stress shocks. The opposite holds for 
                                                          
5 For robustness issues, we experimented with alternative cut-off points. The results remain 
quantitatively the same.  
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Germany, where fiscal spillovers are dominant.  For UK and US both kinds of shocks 
are eminent. Despite the differences, the intensity of spillover effects becomes 
greater after the global financial crisis outbreak. This is consistent with the outcome 
from the cross-country stress transmission analysis. Overall, both methodologies 
highlight that the interconnectedness of financial and fiscal stress has been increased.   
 Our work suggests that economies are not immune to financial conditions 
and fiscal stance of other countries. It also underlines the necessity for global policy 
coordination. Macroprudential policies, along with measures aiming to safeguard 
financial stability should be incorporated to central banks’ mandates. A step towards 
this direction is the effort to establish homogeneous regulatory framework for large 
groups of countries, such as Euro Area, as well as the implementation of the Basel 
Accord requirements. Overall, such initiatives aim to the right direction, which is the 
synchronization of international financial cycle. 
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Figure 1-Financial Stress Indexes 
 
Figure 2-Fiscal Stress Indexes 
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Figure 3A-Canada Financial & Fiscal Gross Spillovers 
 
Figure 3B-Canada Net Spillovers 
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Figure 4A-Germany Financial & Fiscal Gross Spillovers 
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Figure 4B- Germany Net Spillovers 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5A-Japan Financial & Fiscal Gross Spillovers 
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Figure 5B-Japan Net Spillovers 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6A-UK Financial & Fiscal Gross Spillovers 
 
-1
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
ja
-n
e
t
1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2015q1
time
0
5
10
15
1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2015q1
time
uk-fin uk-fisc
27 
 
Figure 6B-UK Net Spillovers 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7A-US Financial & Fiscal Gross Spillovers 
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Figure 7B-US Net Spillovers 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-Cross-Sectional Financial & Fiscal Gross Spillovers 
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Figure 9-Network diagram of Granger-causality relationships for pre-crisis sample 
 
 
 
Figure 10-Network diagram of Granger-causality relationships for post-crisis sample 
 
